Transitions can’t be decreed; they must be co-created

A ten-point agenda for a fair and planned transition away from dependence on fossil fuels

Speech by Dr Arunabha Ghosh
CEO, CEEW, and Special Envoy to COP30 representing South Asia

At session on: Challenges for the Implementation of Paragraph 28 of the GST: Initiatives for Transitioning Away From Fossil Fuels
Hosted by the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change (MMA), Brazil

12 November 2025, Belém: Thank you, Minister Marina Silva for your leadership. Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Namashkar and Boa Tarde.

The phrase “transitioning away from fossil fuels” in Paragraph 28 of the Global Stocktake represents both an extraordinary breakthrough and a profound ambiguity.

For the first time in three decades of climate negotiations, the global community has acknowledged, in clear language, what science has long demanded: that the fossil era must give way to a new energy economy. Yet, we also confront the hard reality that a negotiated phrase is not the same as a shared pathway or a willingness to accept alternative pathways.

Each word of that paragraph carries with it centuries of uneven development — who has grown, who has polluted, who has paid, and who still needs to develop. So, as we gather here to discuss implementation, the question before us is not simply how to move away from fossil fuels, but how to do so in a way that preserves the developmental aspirations of billions of people, while keeping faith with the planet’s ecological limits.

The GST's language leaves "transitioning away” open to interpretation. It does not set timelines, benchmarks, or guardrails for fossil fuel dependence. It does not answer who moves first, who pays most, or how we measure fairness.

GST has to be seen in the correct perspective. The design of GST was meant to present a report card on the global efforts on climate change—bringing out the gaps in mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and informing the next round of NDCs.

Now, the developed countries must take the lead in walking this talk of transitioning away from fossil fuels, ensuring no backsliding. At the same time, developing countries need to be supported to meet their energy needs from renewables and working out the transition without social disruption.

Not one but many energy transitions

Developing countries are not laggards in this story. In fact, many of the breakthroughs in clean energy and climate policy today are emerging from the Global South — from renewable energy auctions that slashed prices in India and Latin America, to distributed solar electrification across Africa, to innovation in biofuels in Brazil. These are the building blocks of a new growth model. But they remain fragmented — islands of success amid an ocean of structural barriers.

To scale them up, we need something far more fundamental than technology or finance alone. We need governance that is anticipatory, cooperative, and credible — governance that aligns global coordination with national ownership, and economic transformation with social justice.

For developing countries, this uncertainty is not theoretical — it translates into fiscal and political risk.

Take India. Coal accounts for 44.7 per cent capacity—supporting over 13 million livelihoods and contributing over USD 8.4 billion annually to public revenues. In South Africa, fossil underpins 79 per cent of the capacity mix and sustains hundreds of thousands of indirect jobs. In Indonesia, fossil resources make over 85 per cent of the country’s power capacity.

An abrupt transition, without viable alternative revenue streams or social protection, risks not only economic disruption but also social dislocation at a scale not experienced elsewhere.

We must recognise these countries are attempting not one but five simultaneous energy transitions:

First, from no access to modern sources of energy to delivering electricity to hundreds of millions of people and striving for clean cooking fuel for more than 2 billion people. We say these numbers with stoic insensitivity and yet, this is our lived reality.

Secondly, from patterns of energy demand in rural areas to managing the huge surge in urbanisation in emerging markets and developing countries and the energy systems that need to sync up with the systems for food, housing, basic utilities and mobility.

Thirdly, from growth to sustainable growth and attempting to build clean energy infrastructure that lights up our homes but is also capable of powering our factories. We need decarbonisation without deindustrialisation. Positive signals are aplenty. Non-fossil sources already make up more than 50 per cent of India’s total installed power capacity, a target achieved more than five years ahead of schedule (the aim for share in electricity generation is 43 per cent by 2030). In Vietnam, the share of solar and wind in the national generation mix has tripled over the past five years (from 5% in 2019 to 15% in 2024) and investments in RE projects are booming. Uruguay had the fastest 5-year period of growth in solar and wind share of electricity from 2013 to 2018 (1% to 35% in 5 years).

Fourthly, from weak bargaining power in global energy markets to deeper integration into these markets by virtue of the scale of demand now arising from EMDEs.

Fifth, from centralised or fragmented energy markets to decentralised and interconnected markets, which means bringing together the energy and digital revolutions and massive upgrades to our energy and digital infrastructure and necessary skills.

“This is not a leapfrog. This is not a triple jump. This is a pentathalon. But sporting metaphors pale in comparison to what developing countries are attempting.”

A ten-point action agenda for the transition

Countries that have taken a linear path of polluting first, cleaning up later and then stalling or slowing down their efforts at the first hints of political backlash at home do not have the experience let alone the medals to flaunt. For instance, the G7's decision to end the use of coal power by 2035 could result in an additional consumption of 2.6 GtCO₂e of emissions, compared to their stated individual targets.

And beyond the domestic challenge lies the external one: inadequate finance, prohibitive costs of capital, and limited access to clean technology. Emerging economies and developing countries receive less than 15 per cent of global investment for energy transition, even though their needs are the greatest. Blended finance, once heralded as a solution, has underperformed — attracting up to seven times less private investment than projected. And despite repeated pledges, predictable concessional flows remain elusive.

The result is a fragmented global effort: ambition without architecture, aspiration without assurance. If we are serious about Paragraph 28, in order to transition away from fossil fuels, we must design pathways of a transition to a just, inclusive clean energy future.

I propose a ten-point agenda.

Policy, institutional and market mechanisms to increase access to energy via clean sources. India’s experience demonstrates that universal access to clean energy need not be sequential; it can be simultaneous and mutually reinforcing. Between 2000 and 2024, over 800 million Indians gained electricity access, with average rural supply hours rising from 12 to 22 per day. This transformation was achieved through strong policy and institutional design—programmes such as Saubhagya built network capacity and household connectivity, while PM KUSUM and PM Surya Ghar added clean, decentralised supply. Institutionally, the Solar Energy Corporation of India became a model for de-risking renewable investments and standardising power-purchase frameworks, bringing tariffs down by ~90 per cent. These national and sub-national innovations must be replicated globally: bundled policy support, combining capital grants and payment-security frameworks, and digital transparency to make clean energy accessible and affordable for the poorest and investible for the private sector.
Technical cooperation on extending grids and interconnections. With increasing share of renewables, grid planning and operations will become more complex and will test our ability to expand and modernise grid infrastructure, operationalise flexibility and build regional interconnections. For instance, CEEW’s research shows that with the expected doubling of renewable energy capacity, India’s grid flexibility requirements will increase 5x in the next five years. Traditional network upgrades alone will not suffice. Countries need targeted interventions—such as high-capacity corridors, scaling energy storage, deploying grid-forming inverters, and strengthening regional inter-connects. The South Asian region, with its complementarities in hydro, solar and wind potential, will benefit from investments in interconnected grid systems. Building the grids of the future will require convergence of technology, regulation, and finance.
Building capacity to manage grids. Capacity building must keep pace with the physics of a changing grid. As millions of new distributed assets, from rooftop solar to electric-mobility chargers, connect to the system, grid operators and regulators need new skills and tools. Across the Global South, we need joint initiatives to train engineers, planners, and regulators on grid planning, forecasting, and managing digital, flexible and interconnected grids. Plurilateral institutions like the ISA can anchor such initiatives, ensuring that capacity building is continuous rather than episodic. The goal is simple: make human capacity the strongest link in our grid-modernisation journey.
Designing the power markets of the future leveraging decentralised energy and digital platforms. Power markets must evolve to build a much more decentralised grid. Market designs must enable the edge of the grid to become the new centre of innovation. Grid-edge technologies—distributed solar with battery storage, smart meters, dynamic tariffs, and demand response systems—can turn consumers into active participants in grid balancing. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) is becoming the backbone of such transformation. India’s rollout of smart meters and Unified Energy Interface (UEI) are establishing the digital rails for transparent, automated, and interoperable energy transactions. These platforms could mirror the success of UPI in finance—enabling seamless participation, instant settlement, and verifiable data exchange across consumers, utilities, and market operators. The next generation markets must reward flexibility and reliability, supported by digital registries and automated settlements. Regulators and market operators must enable time- and location-sensitive electricity pricing, unlock ancillary services markets, and develop hedging instruments to mitigate price volatility in spot markets. Together, these innovations will support countries in making their power markets more efficient and inclusive.
Power livelihoods globally: Distributed renewable energy can unite climate action with human development. Yet most global energy initiatives still stop at household access. Our work shows that when clean energy powers livelihoods—from solar dryers and looms to cold storages and food processors—incomes rise, resilience deepens, and markets expand. To make this real, we propose a global Powering Livelihoods Facility: a USD 2 billion catalytic multilateral platform that blends risk capital, patient finance, and technical assistance to help social enterprises scale and share solutions across geographies. With pooled resources and partnerships of equals, such a mechanism could power two million microenterprises and transform ten million lives, turning distributed renewables into a shared engine for jobs, growth, and dignity.
Build interdependent global value chains for clean tech manufacturing by leveraging green comparative advantage. The next phase of the energy transition cannot be built on concentrated supply chains and trade restrictions. The Global South has the resources the world needs: sunlight, wind, critical minerals, and skilled labour. The Global North has the capital and technology. Together, we can turn these asymmetries into complementary comparative advantages. No country can secure its energy future through protectionism. Four economies dominate 70 per cent of solar exports and 80 per cent of wind components, a concentration too risky to sustain. We, therefore, propose a Global Renewables Supply-Chain Compact (involving developing and developed economies): to jointly map manufacturing capacities, pool infrastructure finance, co-develop technologies, and harmonise standards for batteries, green hydrogen, and other clean-tech industries. Trust and interdependence, not isolation, will make these supply chains resilient, and give every region (and our citizens) a stake in the energy transition.
Diversify access to and refining of critical minerals, including technologies for minerals processing. The clean energy transition cannot rest on monopolised refineries. Critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, silicon, graphite, and rare earths will decide the pace of decarbonisation, yet their processing remains among the most concentrated in history. CEEW’s latest research shows that Indian companies and labs have demonstrated capabilities to process a few critical minerals including rare earths but often struggle in achieving high purity (like 99.99%) economically. Limited manufacturing capabilities and capacities in subsequent value chains, like magnet manufacturing from rare earth oxides, exacerbate the challenge. We need a shared global vision on critical minerals: to jointly map reserves, invest in new exploration and processing technologies, and build regional stockpiles to buffer shocks. The answer lies in South–South refining partnerships, joint R&D for efficient and clean processing, and public-private investments in sustainable refining clusters. Linking innovation with equitable access can turn mineral dependence into mutual security, powering clean growth without repeating the extractive inequities of the past.
Reduce cost of finance: For most developing economies, the highest cost in clean energy is not the turbine or the panel, it is the cost of capital. The poorer the country, the dearer the finance. Our research shows that over 60 per cent of the levelised cost of clean power in low-income economies comes from non-project risks — currency, policy, or offtaker uncertainty. Let us create a Global Clean Investment Risk Mitigation Mechanism, a multilateral platform to pool and insure risks across countries, aggregate smaller projects, and offer transparent, digital access to de-risking tools. The leverage opportunities here would be in the double digits. When finance becomes predictable, ambition becomes affordable, and the transition finally becomes real.
Establish sectoral technology groups for hard-to-abate sectors with open IP: One of the critical challenges in establishing sectoral technology groups for hard-to-abate sectors is the absence of a framework for open intellectual property generation. At present, most actors operate in a highly competitive environment where innovation is viewed primarily as a commercial opportunity rather than as a collective global good. This mindset limits collaboration and hinders the sharing of technologies that could accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. India is already showing the way with LEAD IT in collaboration with Sweden.

To promote open and accessible innovation, there is a clear need for multilateral funds that can catalyse open IP generation through pooled capital and shared risk. Such an approach would enable joint research and development efforts in areas where collaboration is more beneficial than competition. A key step forward is to identify common technology areas—particularly in hard-to-abate sectors—where open IP is essential for achieving global decarbonisation goals. Without such collective initiatives, developing countries risk being seen merely as markets for technologies developed in the Global North rather than as equal partners in innovation.
Build the green economy: The physical asset can be repurposed, the financial asset can be reengineered. What happens to the human asset? What happens to the dignity of labour? We cannot phase out of fossil fuels with a voluntary retirement cheque. We need an alternative paradigm of sustainable growth that is jobs-intensive and future-facing. A green economy represents a move from extractive to regenerative, from linear to circular, and embeds the transition into nature. Dozens of new value chains — from solar to seaweed — can span across the energy transition, circular economy, and bioeconomy, where rural and nature-based jobs get created in bio-inputs, agroforestry, and wetlands restoration and green mobility, renewables, and recycling anchor urban and industrial growth. Our research shows, Odisha alone could add one million new jobs and attract USD 42 billion in investments by 2030, boosting its GDP by 23 per cent.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, transitions cannot be decreed; they must be co-created. When communities see themselves as stakeholders — when they are equipped with the skills, income support, and ownership mechanisms to thrive in the new energy economy — transitions gain social legitimacy and political durability.

At its heart, globally coordinated but nationally-led transitions must rest on reciprocity of ambition and responsibility.

Paragraph 28 was never meant to be an endpoint. It is an invitation to reimagine how we govern energy and economy, finance and fairness in the 21st century.

Perhaps then, the phrase “transitioning away from fossil fuels” will no longer be a line negotiated in the halls of the UN, but a reality lived across our economies, our communities, our citizens and our shared future.

Thank you, Dhanyavaad, Obridago.